The Impacts of Hong Kong's Currency Board Reforms on Its Interbank Market by TSE, Yiu Kuen & YIP, Paul S. L.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Economics School of Economics
12-2003
The Impacts of Hong Kong's Currency Board
Reforms on Its Interbank Market
Yiu Kuen TSE
Singapore Management University, yktse@smu.edu.sg
Paul S. L. YIP
Nanyang Technological University
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0378-4266(02)00326-6
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, and the Finance Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Economics at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Economics by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge
at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
TSE, Yiu Kuen and YIP, Paul S. L.. The Impacts of Hong Kong's Currency Board Reforms on Its Interbank Market. (2003). Journal of
Banking and Finance. 27, (12), 2273-2296. Research Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/320
The Impacts of Hong Kong’s Currency Board
Reforms on the Interbank Market
Y.K. Tse
School of Business, Singapore Management University,
469 Bukit Timah Road, Singapore 259756
E-mail: yktse@smu.edu.sg, Fax: (65) 6822-0777, Telephone: (65) 6822-0257
and
Paul S.L. Yip
Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University
Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798
E-mail: aslyip@ntu.edu.sg, Fax: (65) 6791-3697, Telephone: (65) 6790-4983
First draft: July 2001
Revised: January 2002
Abstract: Among the economies with a Currency Board System (CBS), Hong Kong
(HK) is probably the one with (i) the largest and most developed financial sector, and (ii)
the highest capital mobility. Hence, studying HK’s CBS is not only crucial to HK, but
also important for the understanding of the modern CBS. This paper outlines the major
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1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis are then examined empirically. We focus on the diﬀeren-
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1 Introduction
Among the economies with a Currency Board System (CBS), Hong Kong (HK) is the
one with the highest daily turnover in the interbank market, in the foreign exchange
market, in the stock market as well as in the stock index futures market.1 Capital is
allowed to flow freely in and out of the economy. Thus, among the economies with a
CBS, HK is probably the one with (i) the largest and most developed financial sector,
and (ii) the highest capital mobility. Hence, studying HK’s CBS and money market is
not only crucial to HK, but also important to the understanding of the modern CBS.
Until recently empirical studies on the CBS were in general favourable to the system.
McCarthy and Zanalda (1996) compared the inflation and growth performances of the
Caribbean countries and found that the subgroup of countries operating under a CBS
had lower inflation and higher growth than other Caribbean economies, though they
attributed part of this to the greater concessionary flows to the currency board members.
Kwan and Lui (1996) compared the performance of the CBS in HK since October 1983
to the previous floating-rate regime during 1974-83. Based on a simulation study, they
concluded that inflation and output growth, and volatility of the two, would have been
lower during the floating-rate period had HK operated under a CBS. Ghosh et al (1998)
compared inflation and output growth in countries with currency boards to countries
with other less extreme forms of exchange-rate peg. They found that the average inflation
rate under currency boards is about 4 percentage points lower than that of other pegged
exchange-rate systems. They also showed that while some of this might be attributed to
1The average daily turnover in the HK dollar interbank market and swap market in 2000 were HK$87
billion (US$11 billion) and HK$106 billion (US$14 billion), respectively. According to a recent survey
the average daily turnover in HK’s foreign exchange market was the seventh largest in the world. The
average daily turnover in HK’s stock market in 2000 was HK$12.3 billion. The average daily turnover
in the Hang Seng Stock Index Futures in 2000 was 16,292 contracts, equivalent to a contract value of
HK$13 billion. Among the economies with a CBS, HK has the largest number of foreign (123) and
local (31) banks. In addition to the above, HK ranks well within the world’s top ten in its foreign
exchange holdings (US$108 billion at end 2000), external trade (US$415 billion in 2000), and stock
market capitalisation (US$604 billion in 2000).
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the greater monetary discipline under the CBS, the bulk of the diﬀerence was explained
by the greater confidence engendered by adopting a CBS. Such eﬀects resulted in higher
money demand and hence lower inflation for a given monetary growth rate. They also
showed that the result was qualitatively the same even if one controls for the regime
choice endogeneity (i.e., countries with a greater proclivity toward low inflation may be
more likely to adopt a CBS). Regarding the growth performance, they also found that
countries with a CBS on average grew faster than countries with either pegged exchange
rates or floating exchange rates. While recognizing that it is unlikely that this growth
performance can be explained by exchange-rate regimes alone, they highlighted that the
opposite proposition — the CBS leads to more sluggish growth — receives no support from
the data.
Ghosh et al admitted that currency boards are more constraining on credit policy
and on the ability of the authorities to alter the exchange-rate parity. This is important
in case of crisis where there could be misalignment of exchange rate and credit crunch.
Along this line, Yip and Wang (2002) showed that the fixed exchange rate implied by the
CBS plus the sluggish adjustment speed of the export price in HK played an important
role in explaining the poor export performance of HK’s total export during the post-
Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) period. They also believed that the fixed exchange rate
implicit in the CBS plus the sluggish adjustment of the gross domestic product (GDP)
deflator, consumer price index and wage rate in HK was one of the main reasons for
the long and on-going deflation, recession and high unemployment rate after the AFC.
Parallel with this, Yip and Wang (2001) showed that Singapore’s use of exchange-rate
depreciation has helped mitigate the adverse impact of the crisis on its export. As
a result, Singapore was less aﬀected by the crisis, despite the fact that Singapore’s
economic relationships with the crisis-aﬀected economies were closer than those of HK.
Using the surge in interest rates as a proxy for financial dis-intermediation caused by the
crisis, they argued that the diﬀerence in the exchange-rate system in HK caused a more
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severe liquidity crunch in HK than in Singapore, which in turn was shown to contribute
to a weaker export (and deeper recession) in HK.
While the above literature has focused their evaluation of the CBS on broader eco-
nomic measures like inflation, export growth and GDP growth, there is so far no rigorous
empirical study on the behaviour of interest rates under the CBS. As highlighted by Chen
and Chan (1998), Tsang (1999), Miller (1998) and Yip (1999), the substantial surge in
HK’s interest rate during the crisis period was the main cause of the subsequent plunge
in asset price and recession, and hence the source of pain in HK during the crisis and
post-crisis period. The interest-rate hikes in Argentina in the 2001 debt crisis and the
1998 Brazilian crisis were probably other examples of similar incidences. Thus, the be-
haviour of interest rates under the CBS is a very important issue. This paper attempts
to examine this issue empirically. HK is probably the best choice for such an empiri-
cal study because it has a CBS with a well developed financial sector and high capital
mobility. This makes HK’s modern CBS an important benchmark for international com-
parisons, evaluations and theoretical developments of the CBS. As noted by Kwan and
Lui (1996), ” ... the economic health and significant strength of Hong Kong provide an
almost ideal situation to test the vulnerability of a currency board system when it is
confronted with a crisis. ... if ... Hong Kong’s currency board has to face a crisis when it
is subject to shocks of specified magnitude, then it is hard to imagine that the currency
board in a country with poorer economic health can survive under the same scenario.”
Since the late 1980s, HK has adopted a few monetary reforms that may have substan-
tial impacts on the interbank market. In this paper we examine the eﬀectiveness of these
monetary reforms empirically. In particular, we investigate (i) whether the monopoly
and special position of HK’s largest colonial bank in creating money (without foreign
exchange backup) before the reform in 1988 led to a downward bias in HK’s interest
rate relative to the US, which may have in turn contributed to unnecessary inflation,
(ii) whether the reform introduced in 1988 rectified the above problem, (iii) whether the
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introduction of HK’s version of discount window in 1992 helped reduce the volatility
of HK’s interest rates relative to the US, (iv) whether the misguided reform in 1994,
which could have fueled the excessive initial public oﬀer (IPO) over-subscriptions, also
led to a downward bias in HK’s interest rate. Finally, we investigate to what extend
the AFC in 1997-98 destabilized the interbank market, and whether the reform in the
anti-crisis package introduced in September 1998 succeeded in rectifying the loophole in
HK’s CBS.
It has been suggested that, before the AFC, HK’s CBS was in general highly credible
among market participants, despite the fact that HK had slightly violated the foreign
exchange backup rule (of a CBS) on money supply before the reform in 1988 and dur-
ing the misguided reform between 1994 and 1997 (see the explanations in subsequent
sections). As a result, a small premium (and at times even a downward bias) in HK’s
interest rates relative to the US was found. However, with the outbreak of the AFC,
public confidence in and credibility of the system were greatly reduced among the mar-
ket participants. This was translated into devaluation expectations and risk premium,
which in turn created a substantial surge in the HK-US interest-rate diﬀerential. With
the introduction of the anti-crisis package and the eventual fading out of the crisis,
credibility of HK’s CBS seems to have come back despite a very bleak economic out-
look induced by the recession, asset deflation and surge in unemployment. As a result,
the HK-US interest-rate diﬀerential reverted back to the pre-crisis level despite a very
poor macroeconomic environment. These incidences provide an excellent opportunity to
study the impacts of the CBS credibility on the level and volatility of the interest rates.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we outline the characteristics of
the CBS in HK and some of its monetary reforms that may have impacts on the inter-
bank market. We also discuss the impacts of the speculative attack on the HK interest
rate, and the subsequent reforms. In Section 3 we specify the empirical model and the
econometric methodology for analyzing the interest-rate data. Section 4 summarizes the
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empirical results and assesses the impacts of the monetary reforms. Section 5 provides
the conclusion.
2 A Review of HK’s CBS and Its Monetary Reforms
Prior to its present CBS, HK adopted the floating exchange rate system between 1974
and 1983. With the 1983 Sino-Anglo dispute on the return of HK’s sovereignty to China
after 1997, a confidence crisis quickly emerged. The HK dollar was under severe pressure
(the HK dollar fell from US$1 to HK$5.13 in 1981 to US$1 to HK$9.8 in 1983). To pre-
empt the weakening of confidence from deteriorating into a full blown economic crisis,
the HK government adopted the CBS on 17 October 1983. Under this system, the
money supply in HK is fully backed up by US dollar held at the Exchange Fund (of the
Currency Board),2 and the HK dollar is eﬀectively fixed at the oﬃcial rate of US$1 to
HK$7.8. Because of the high capital mobility and the fixed exchange rate system, HK’s
interest rate has then tended to follow the US interest rate fairly closely. Nevertheless,
there have been moderate diﬀerences between the HK and US interest rates from time
to time due to various reasons, such as the diﬀerences in the economic and political
environments, and the occurrence of the AFC in 1997-1998.
Since the late 1980s HK has adopted several monetary reforms to strengthen the
CBS. In this section we review the major reforms and their targeted objectives. The
eﬀectiveness of these reforms will then be examined empirically in Section 4.
2.1 The Accounting Arrangements
When the linked exchange-rate system was first put into place in October 1983, the
interbank clearing system was not run by the Currency Board, but by HK’s largest
2Under the system, any one of the three note-issuing banks wishing to print HK dollar notes need
to surrender an equivalent amount of US dollar (at the oﬃcial rate) to the Exchange Fund in exchange
for the Certificate of Indebtedness (CI), which entitles the note-issuing bank to print that amount of
HK dollar. On the other hand, the note-issuing banks can always use their holdings of the CIs and HK
dollar notes to redeem an equivalent amount of US dollar from the Exchange Fund.
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commercial bank, namely, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited
(HSBC). Under the arrangement, all licensed banks in HK maintained a clearing account
directly with the HSBC or indirectly through another settlement bank. HSBC was the
controller of the aggregate balance (net clearing balance) of the whole banking system
and was therefore in a position to create money. The aggregate balance was determined
by the commercial activities of HSBC in the money market and foreign exchange market,
as well as by the activities of its customers. When HSBC lent to other banks or bought
assets (including foreign exchange), or when HSBC’s customers drew cheques and paid
them to customers of other banks, the aggregate balance increased. There was no
requirement and no need for HSBC to back up this monetary base by foreign exchange.
Consequently, there was no arrangement imposed upon HSBC to subject the aggregate
balance to the Monetary Rule (foreign exchange backup rule) of the CBS.
Control over the aggregate balance was eventually brought under the Currency Board
in July 1988 through the so called Accounting Arrangements. These arrangements
reversed the customer-banker relationship between the Currency Board and HSBC in
that HSBC was required to operate a clearing account with the Currency Board. As
HSBC was still the management bank of the Clearing House and all other licensed
banks still maintained clearing accounts directly or indirectly with it, HSBC was further
required to conduct its interbank activities so that the net clearing balance of the rest
of the banking system was not bigger than the balance in its account at the Currency
Board. The aggregate balance thus operated as a cap on HSBC’s ability to create
money, beyond which the Accounting Arrangements imposed a penal rate of interest
on the excess. Given that the aggregate balance can only be altered when transactions
were conducted with the Currency Board, this balance was then defined and subject to
the indirect control of the Currency Board.
The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) (see HKMA, 1994) argued that
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Before the introduction of Accounting Arrangements, there tended to be
a downward bias in local interest rates relative to the US dollar interest rates,
as there was a lack of eﬀective control over the extension of credits in the
interbank market. The Accounting Arrangements built in such control and
has therefore helped to narrow the gap between HK dollar and US dollar
interest rates. In terms of the three-month rates, for instance, the diﬀeren-
tial was about 100 basis points in favor of the US dollar during the period
November 1983 to June 1988. During the period July 1988 to October 1994,
the diﬀerential was a mere 23 basis points.
We will examine in Section 4 whether HSBC’s special position (in creating money
without foreign exchange backup) during the period before the Accounting Arrange-
ments had on average reduced the local interest rates relative to the US interest rates.
We will also investigate whether the HSBC’s position contributed to a higher or lower
volatility of the interest-rate diﬀerential.
Before proceeding to the next monetary reform, a point of interest is that the down-
ward bias could be beneficial or harmful to the HK economy, depending on the boom
and bust conditions of the economy at the time. If the economy is close to the full-
employment level, the downward bias is probably harmful by adding unnecessary infla-
tionary pressure. On the other hand, if the aggregate demand is weak, the downward
bias is beneficial in stimulating aggregate demand.
2.2 The Liquidity Adjustment Facility
The Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF) introduced on 1 July 1992 is the HK version
of discount window.3 Under the facility, licensed banks can borrow over-night funds
from the HKMA through repurchase agreements of eligible securities at the oﬀer rate
3In general, as the LAF is directly related to the over-night rate and only indirectly related to the
three-month rate, the impact of the LAF on the over-night rate is more significant and pronounced
than that on the three-month rate.
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and can place surplus funds over-night with the HKMA at the bid rate. The HKMA
argued that this facility has eﬀectively set the floor and ceiling of the over-night interest
rate. Through the licensed banks’ demand for and utilization of the facility, the HKMA
can also supply additional liquidity or mob up excess liquidity from the whole banking
system.
According to the HKMA, the facility helped reduce the volatility of the over-night
rate during periods of transitory tight liquidity such as substantial over-subscription of
IPO (see HKMA, 1994):
There were a total of 63 IPOs in 1993, involving enormous amounts of
subscription monies. The most notable example was the IPO of Denway
which was about 600 times over-subscribed. Subscription monies involving
$240 billion had to be recycled through the interbank market on the closing
date. Over-night rate firmed up 50 basis points above the LAF oﬀer rate
as many banks were aggressively bidding for funds. In response, the HKMA
increased the level of interbank liquidity to provide some relief to the market.
On the whole, the intraday volatility in the interbank market was much
lower compared with the situation before the introduction of the Accounting
Arrangements and LAF. For example, the Cathay Pacific IPO in 1986 and
the Oriental Press IPO in 1987 resulted in a rise of 12.75 percentage points
and 6 percentage points respectively in HIBOR.
It is interesting to note that the facility could have in fact fuelled the already high
over-subscription rates of the IPOs in HK. We will examine in Section 4 whether the
LAF did in fact reduce the volatility of the over-night interbank rate and reduce the gap
between the HK and US over-night interbank rates. As the lending rate is more related
to longer-term (e.g., three-month) interbank rates instead of over-night interbank rate,
reducing the volatility of over-night rate may not have strong impacts on the economy
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if the volatility of the longer-term rates remains unchanged. Therefore, we will also
investigate whether the LAF had any impacts on the three-month interbank rate.
2.3 The Revised Mode of Monetary Operations
Realizing that the over-night rate may still breach the range set by the LAF, the HKMA
adopted a Revised Mode of Monetary Operations from mid-March 1994. Under the
Revised Mode, the HKMA targeted the short-term interbank interest rate instead of the
level of interbank liquidity in its money-market operations (see HKMA, 1994):
This entails the injection or withdrawal of liquidity to prevent the over-
night HIBOR from breaching the range set by the LAF Bid and Oﬀer Rates.
The actual amount will therefore be determined by the prevailing market
conditions.
Thereafter, the HKMA made far more active short-term interventions during both
the IPOs and seasonal (month-end or quarter-end) period (see HKMA, 1994):
For example, towards the end of March (1994), money market condi-
tions tightened considerably as banks became cautious in lending before the
quarter-end which coincided with a long weekend. The HKMA injected
(HK)$3.8 billion into the interbank market, thereby preventing the over-
night HIBOR from breaching the LAF Oﬀer Rate. The excess liquidity was
withdrawn in early April when market conditions started to ease.
In Section 4 we will examine whether the revised mode of monetary operations helped
reduce the level and volatility of the HK-US interest-rate diﬀerential. We will also
investigate whether the impacts of the reform on the over-night rate are diﬀerent from
those on the three-month interbank rate.
Before turning to the next reform, we shall make some comments on the reforms
discussed so far. According to the classical CBS, the monetary authority should let the
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market demand determine the local quantity of money supply and refrain from creating
liquidity — whether short-term or long-term — without a parallel increase in the foreign
exchange backup (see Schwartz (1993) and Tsang and Ma (2002)). In such a system,
interest rates and money supply should be determined by market forces. Nevertheless,
in the reforms discussed above we observe that the HKMA had a tendency of introduc-
ing and justifying the freedom in monetary operations (i.e., a tendency to deviate from
the classical CBS). In addition to arguing that the provision of short-term liquidity to
finance the huge over-subscription of IPOs and seasonal demands may or may not be
desirable, we believe that a shift towards the Revised Mode of Monetary Operations may
represent a dangerous step away from the monetary rule (foreign exchange backup rule)
of the CBS (i.e., the local money supply is also aﬀected by the HKMA intervention).
For example, suppose some speculators borrow a large amount of HK dollar through
the foreign exchange swap market. According to the mechanism inherent in the CBS,
this will tend to bid up the HK interest rate, which would in turn attract capital in-
flows through interest arbitrage. Under the Revised Mode of Monetary Operations, the
HKMA supplies short-term liquidity when they see a rise in the HK interest rate. By the
same token, some fundamental changes could create an upward/downward pressure on
interest rate, which would in turn change the local money supply through the standard
mechanism. If this is not recognized, the HKMA may supply additional liquidity with-
out a parallel increase in foreign exchange backup. It is noted, however, that HKMA’s
interventions have been so far short-term in nature.
2.4 The Crisis and Subsequent Reforms
HK’s financial market was under severe speculative attack during the AFC in October
1997. The strategy of the speculators was to bid up HK’s interbank rate and subse-
quently benefit from the huge short positions they had built up in the stock futures
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market prior to the launch of their attack.4
In view of the surge in interest rate, the plunge in asset prices and hence the harm
done to the HK economy, Chen and Chan (1998), Tsang (1999),5 Miller (1998) and Yip
(1999)6 made proposals to bring down the interest rate and hence the economic pain.
Of particular interest are the proposals by Tsang and Yip. Tsang first argued that
because of institutional imperfection, cash arbitrage (between the market exchange rate
and the oﬃcial linked rate) was never operative in HK’s linked exchange rate system.
He proposed to modernize HK’s Currency Board by adopting the “convertible reserves
mechanism” of Argentina, Estonia and Lithuania (the AEL model), under which arbi-
trage could be done electronically without moving cash around. In the design, each bank
will have an account with the central bank, in which deposit reserves as well as other
balances are kept. The central bank guarantees the full convertibility of these bank bal-
ances at the oﬃcial exchange rate. Tsang believed this would correct the institutional
imperfection and make cash arbitrage operative. He also mentioned the possibility of
interest arbitrage under this system. However, Tsang did not explicitly elaborate the
mechanism to remove the exchange-rate risk of interest arbitrage, which some researchers
(see Yip, 1999) believe is the main reason that stops the HK interest rate from falling
to the US level during the crisis.
In addition to Tsang’s suggested set-up, Yip proposed to use the electronic Certificate
of Indebtedness as a guarantee to remove the exchange-rate risk of interest arbitrage.7
With the guarantee, banks would be interested in earning the interest diﬀerential by
borrowing US dollar (from aboard) at the low US interest rate and lending HK dollar
4The Appendix provides an account of the speculators’ strategy.
5The proposal was first made in 1997, and was subsequently included in Tsang (1999).
6The proposal was first made in an internal report in the Bank of China (Hong Kong-Macau Regional
Oﬃce) in 1997, and was released in a local newspaper (Hong Kong Economic Journal) on 24 February
1998. It was then subsequently included in Yip (1999).
7Under the colonial CBS, Certificates of Indebtedness (CIs) are certificates that guarantee the holders
can always use the CIs and domestic currency to exchange for an equivalent amount of foreign currency
specified in the CIs.
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at the high HK interest rate. Thus, with the guarantee, interest arbitrage will continue
until the HK interest rate falls back to the US level.
The HKMA modified and adopted these proposals into its anti-crisis package in
September 1998. Meanwhile, speculators were able to repeat their October 1997 spec-
ulative strategy (see the details in the Appendix) in January, April, June and August
1998. While speculators earned substantial profits from these attacks, Yip (1999) re-
ported that the harm done to the HK economy far exceeded the speculators’ profits. In
the speculative attack during August 1998, the HKMA opted for stock market interven-
tions. Nevertheless, with the weak market sentiment, traditional funds dumped about
HK$100 billion HK shares on 31 August 1998, and the HKMA was forced to purchase
all these shares.
To avoid the development in the stock market from deteriorating into a deeper crisis,
the HKMA modified the recommendations of the researchers and came up with its
own reform package (or modern CBS) on 5 September 1998, highlighted under seven
Technical Measures. Of the seven measures, the most important measures are: (i) an
exchange rate guarantee (convertibility undertaking) for the banks’ net balance in the
account with the HKMA, and (ii) a modification of previous practice to a discount
window which allows banks substantial freedom to use their holdings of Exchange Fund
debts as a collateral for over-night liquidity borrowing from the HKMA (see Yam, 1998).
Measure (i) removes the exchange-rate risk of banks’ interest arbitrage activities and
hence brings the HK interest rate in line with the US interest rate. Measure (ii) aims
at allowing an increase in interbank liquidity in case of speculative attack, so that the
impacts of the attack on the interbank rate can be mitigated. Before this reform, HK
banks’ clearing balance and interbank liquidity were relatively small.8 Thus, allowing
the interbank liquidity to expand when deemed necessary may stop the speculators from
8As a result, it took only US$1-2 billion spot selling of the HK dollar in the foreign exchange market
to create a substantial shortage of interbank liquidity on 23 October 1997.
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squeezing the interbank liquidity (and hence interbank rate) with a relatively small
amount of spot selling of the HK dollar. To justify this arrangement, the HKMA re-
defined its monetary base to cover the currency issued, the banks’ net clearing balance
with the HKMA and the debts issued by the Exchange Fund. The HKMA justified their
definition of monetary base by arguing that all the three components are fully backed
up by their holdings of foreign reserve.9
After the introduction of the Technical Measures, the interest rate in HK began to fall
gradually towards the US level in the fourth quarter of 1998. By mid-October 1998, the
three-month interbank rate was only 6%, as compared to 11.8% on 14 September 1998.
With further cuts in the US interest rate and a continued reduction in the interest-rate
diﬀerential, the HK three-month interbank rate fell further to 5.63% on 28 December
1998, which was only 0.4 percentage point higher than the US rate. In Section 4 we will
examine the impacts of the AFC and the Technical Measures on HK’s interbank market.
2.5 Summary of the Hypotheses to be tested
Summarizing the previous discussions, we present our synopsis for the level and volatility
of the HK-US over-night and three-month interest-rate diﬀerentials in Table 1.10 Of
particular interests are Remarks 5b, 6c and 7c. As noted in Remark 5c, whenever
there was any shortage in liquidity in the over-night interbank market during the AFC,
the HKMA could have provided additional liquidity through the LAF, money market
activities or other channels,11 causing a quick reversal of the over-night rate back to the
9No doubt, such definition and arrangement did help discourage speculative attacks. It is, however,
interesting to note that HK is probably the only economy in the world that includes long-term bonds
as a component of the monetary base.
10See Section 3 below for the starting and ending dates of the seven subperiods.
11For example, with the shortage in over-night liquidity in the interbank market on 23 October 1997,
the LAF borrowings surged from HK$2.082 billions on 23 October to HK$9.578 billions on 24 October.
Meanwhile, the HKMA injected, through its money market activities, HK$1.982 billions on 23 October
and another HK$4.444 billions on 24 October into the banking system. As another example, to oﬀset
the speculators’ liquidity squeeze during the early August 1998, the HKMA injected liquidity into the
system using the opportunity (or excuse) of the “usual deficit season” for the Treasury in which there
would be a sizable drawdown from the Exchange Fund by the Treasury to pay for government expenses.
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normal level. If this is the case, there may not be a significant surge in the average level
of the over-night rate, although the surge in the first day of an individual shock may be
substantial. Remarks 6c and 7c discuss how changes in the HKMA liquidity injection
behaviour may aﬀect the behaviour of the over-night rate during the second phase of
the crisis period and the post-crisis period.
3 The Data and the Methodology
Our data consist of daily observations of the HK and US interbank interest rates, namely,
the HIBOR and LIBOR.12 The over-night and three-month interbank interest rates were
obtained from the Datastream. The data cover the period 2 February 1987 through 30
March 2001, with 3695 observations in total.13
Figures 1 and 2 plot the over-night interbank rates and their first diﬀerences, respec-
tively. Similarly, Figures 3 and 4 plot the three-month interbank rates. In these figures
the dashed lines indicate the changes in the monetary regimes (reforms) and the dashed-
dotted lines define the period of the AFC.14 Table 2 provides some summary statistics
for the data, as well as the tests for unit root using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
test. The ADF statistics show that the hypothesis that the US interbank interest rates
are nonstationary cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level, while the hypothesis that
the HK interbank interest rates are nonstationary cannot be rejected at the 1 percent
level.15 In contrast, the hypothesis that the diﬀerenced interest rates of both maturities
Thus, after explaining the need to fund the actual and anticipated drawdown by the Treasury, the
HKMA justified switching some of its foreign currency reserves into HK dollar. The latter in turn
counteracted some of the selling pressures on the HK dollar, leaving the aggregate balance of the
banking system unchanged. For more details, see the Operation of Monetary Policy in the November
1998 issue of the HKMA Quarterly Bulletin.
12These stand for the HK Interbank Oﬀer Rate and the London Interbank Oﬀer Rate, respectively.
13Although the CBS in HK came into eﬀect in 1983, the data we collected from Datastream were
only available from 1987.
14See the discussion below for the definition of the AFC period. The dashed and dashed-dotted lines
divide the sample into seven nonoverlapping subperiods. These subperiods are also presented in Figures
5 and 6 below.
15The results of these tests are based on the critical values given by MacKinnon (1991).
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are nonstationary are rejected at the 1 percent level. Thus, the results indicate that the
interbank interest rate series contain a unit root.
Figures 5 and 6 plot the diﬀerentials between the HK and US interbank rates. We can
see that for the period prior to the first reform (Accounting Arrangements) and during
the AFC, there were signs of regime shift. Johansen’s likelihood ratio trace statistics
for the null hypothesis of no cointegrated relationship among the HK and US series
are 130.721 and 34.098, respectively, for the over-night and three-month rates.16 Also,
the likelihood ratio trace statistics for the null hypothesis of at most one cointegrated
equation are 3.178 and 1.169, respectively, for the over-night and three-month rates.
Thus, there is evidence in support of the hypothesis that the HK and US interbank
rates are cointegrated, both for the over-night and three-month interest-rate data.
As discussed in the last section, we will examine the impacts of the monetary reforms
introduced since the late 1980s and the eﬀects of the AFC on the level and volatility
of HK’s interbank rates relative to their US counterparts. While the identification of
various regime changes due to the currency board reforms are aided by policy announce-
ments, the demarcation of the AFC is not clear-cut. Nonetheless, the AFC represents an
enormous external impact and may cause a structural break in the econometric model.
Model misspecification occurs if the structural break is not recognized. At the peril of
over-simplification we define the AFC as the period from 23 October 1997 through 18
December 1998. The dates are so chosen because (i) 23 October 1997 is well known to
be the day when HK’s interbank rates made substantial surge due to speculators’ selling
of HK dollar in the foreign exchange market, and (ii) 18 December 1998 is the day when
the HK Association of Bank (HKAB) reduced its deposit saving rate, not because of
any reduction in the US interest rate but because the HKAB perceived the crisis was
probably over.
16See Johansen (1988) for the use of the likelihood ratio test for cointegration. The critical values of
the tests can be found in Osterwald-Lenum (1990).
15
Thus, the AFC overlaps the periods of Revised Mode of Monetary Operations and
Technical Measures. To allow for the interaction of the AFC with the regime changes,
we partition the periods of these two regime changes into distinct sub-periods with
or without the AFC. In sum, the sample period is divided into the following seven
nonoverlapping sub-periods:
Sub-periods (No. of obs.) Events
P1: 87/2/2 — 88/6/30 (369) No monetary reform
P2: 88/7/1 — 92/5/31 (1022) Accounting Arrangements
P3: 92/6/1 — 94/3/15 (466) Liquidity Adjustment Facility
P4: 94/3/16 — 97/10/22 (941) Revised Mode of Operations, without AFC
P5: 97/10/23 — 98/9/04 (227) Revised Mode of Operations, with AFC
P6: 98/9/5 — 98/12/18 (75) Technical Measures, with AFC
P7: 98/12/19 — 01/3/30 (595) Technical Measures, without AFC
We denote the HK interbank rate (over-night or three-month) at time t by rHt and the
corresponding US interbank rate (over-night or three-month) by rUt. Let yt = rHt− rUt
denote the interest-rate diﬀerential. As rHt and rUt are found to be nonstationary while
yt is found to be stationary (see the discussions above), we model the dynamics of the
interest-rate diﬀerential yt using an autoregressive process.17 Furthermore, we allow
the volatility of the interest-rate diﬀerentials to be time-varying. In addition, dummy
variables are introduced in the conditional-mean and conditional-variance equations to
capture the eﬀects of the reforms and the AFC. We define Di, i = 1, ..., 7, as a dummy
variable such that Dit = 1 if t belongs to the sub-period Pi. Thus, the conditional-mean
equation is given by
yt =
7[
i=1
δiDit +
p[
j=1
φjyt−j + εt
so that yt follows an autoregressive process of order p. The time-varying intercept δi
determines the average interest-rate diﬀerential in each sub-period.
17For simplicity in estimation we use autoregressive process to model the stationary series yt.
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We assume the conditional-variance of the residual εt follows a generalized autore-
gressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) process. The GARCH model was first
suggested by Bollerslev (1986) following the earlier work of Engle (1982), and has since
been applied extensively in the empirical finance literature.18 Thus, by assumption εt |
Φt−1 ∼ N(0,σ2t ), such that conditional on the information set Φt−1 at time t−1 the resid-
ual εt is distributed as a normal variable with mean zero and variance σ2t . In particular,
we assume a GARCH(1, 1) model such that
σ2t =
7[
i=1
γiDit + αε2t−1 + βσ2t−1
In this equation the conditional-variance is allowed to shift according to the sub-period.
The parameter γi determines the shift in the volatility of the interest-rate diﬀerential in
sub-period Pi.
We estimate the parameters of the conditional-mean and conditional-variance equa-
tions jointly using the quasi-MLE (QMLE) method (see Bollerslev and Wooldridge,
1992), and adopt a general-to-specific approach by testing the restrictions on the dummy
variables, which are tests of the impacts of the reforms and the AFC. Restrictions on
model parameters are tested using the likelihood ratio (LR) statistic. LR is distributed
approximately as a χ2R when the restrictions are valid, where R denotes the number of
restrictions on the parameters.
4 The Empirical Results
Tables 3 and 4 summarize the estimated general models for the over-night and three-
month interbank interest-rate diﬀerentials, respectively. As can be seen from δˆ1, HK’s
over-night and three-month interbank rates were statistically significantly lower than
their US counterparts prior to the Accounting Arrangements (i.e., in sub-period P1).
Thus, there is support for HKMA’s claim that during this period the HSBC was able to
18See, for example, Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992) for a survey.
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exploit its position as a clearing bank by creating money without an appropriate increase
in the US dollar backup, causing a downward bias in the diﬀerential between the HK
and US interest rates. Of particular interest is that the downward bias for the over-night
rate (302 basis points) was markedly larger than that for the three-month rate (89 basis
points). This suggests a very interesting behavior of the HSBC: The HSBC was more
willing to create money for very short-term (over-night) loans/transactions rather than
longer-term (three-month) loans/transactions. The HSBC’s lower (higher) willingness
to take risk in the longer (shorter) term in turn led to a larger downward bias in the
over-night rate.
With the introduction of the Accounting Arrangements in July 1988, the HSBC
was no longer capable of creating HK dollar as mentioned. As a result, the HK-US
interest-rate diﬀerential returned to positive under the Accounting Arrangements (i.e.,
in sub-period P2). HK’s over-night and three-month interbank rates were on average 18.2
basis points and 32.7 basis points above their US counterparts, respectively. If we take
the diﬀerential during this period as a “normal” reflection of the political and economic
risk premium between HK and the US, we can infer that HSBC’s special position during
the pre-Accounting-Arrangements period led to a downward bias of HK’s over-night
and three-month interbank rates of 3.20 percentage points and 1.22 percentage points,
respectively. The LR statistic for H0 : δ1 = δ2 are 57.2602 and 18.4132, respectively,
for the over-night and three-month rates. Thus, the null hypothesis of no change in the
diﬀerential is convincingly rejected for both cases. A comparison of the estimates of γ2
and γ1 also shows that the HSBC’s special position led to a higher volatility in HK’s
interbank rates. The LR statistics for H0 : γ1 = γ2 are 153.1784 and 5.1374, respectively,
for the over-night and three-month rates. Thus, the volatility of HK’s interest rate during
the pre-Accounting-Arrangements sub-period P1 was significantly higher than that in
sub-period P2. This shows that HSBC’s special position in sub-period P1 did not only
cause downward bias in HK’s interest rate, but also higher volatility in the interest-rate
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diﬀerentials. Again, because of HSBC’s higher risk aversion over the longer end, the
change in the volatility of the over-night rate was markedly higher than that of the
three-month rate.
For the eﬀect of the introduction of the LAF in sub-period P3, Tables 3 and 4
show that γˆ3 is lower than γˆ2 for both the over-night and three-month rates. The LR
statistics for H0 : γ2 = γ3 are 3.5934 and 114.0080, respectively, for the over-night and
three-month rates, supporting the hypotheses listed in Table 1. That is, in addition to
supporting the HKMA’s claim that the introduction of the LAF reduced the volatility of
the over-night rate, we also find that the LAF reduced the volatility of the three-month
rate. The estimates of δ3 for HK’s over-night and three-month rates are lower than δˆ2,
providing a mild evidence that the introduction of the LAF may have also reduced the
average level of HK’s over-night and three-month rates. Nevertheless, the LR statistics
for H0 : δ2 = δ3 are only 1.3084 and 2.3556, respectively, implying that the impacts of
the LAF on the levels of HK’s interest rates are not statistically significant.
We now come to the Revised Mode of Monetary Operations introduced since March
1994. As explained in Section 2, under this regime, the HKMA became more active in
injecting short-term liquidity to finance IPO over-subscriptions and seasonal demands.
Tables 3 and 4 show that γˆ4 for HK’s over-night and three-month rates are lower than
γˆ2, providing some support for the hypotheses listed in Table 1. The LR statistics
for H0 : γ2 = γ4 are 85.0286 and 184.6124 for the over-night and three-month rates,
respectively. In comparison, the LR statistics for H0 : γ3 = γ4 are, respectively, 35.6182
and 0.3156 for the over-night and three-month rates. Thus, there is empirical evidence
that the Revised Mode of Monetary Operations reduced the volatility of HK’s over-night
interbank rates. Perhaps more interesting is the impact of the Revised Mode on the
levels of HK’s interest rates. Tables 3 and 4 show that the estimates of δ4 are negative,
suggesting that the Revised Mode re-established a downward bias in HK’s over-night and
three-month interest diﬀerentials by 35.3 basis points and 9.9 basis points, respectively.
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A comparison between δˆ4 with δˆ3 and δˆ2 shows that the Revised Mode reduced the level of
HK’s interbank rate — a consequence that has never been addressed or recognized by the
HKMA. Tests for H0 : δ2 = δ4 and H0 : δ3 = δ4 confirm that the impacts are statistically
significant. The LR statistic for the former hypothesis are 21.4522 and 14.6878 for the
over-night and three-month rates, respectively, while the LR statistics for the latter test
are 7.7313 and 7.6674 for the over-night and three-month rates, respectively.
Regarding the impacts of the AFC on the three-month interbank rate, the results
in Table 4 show that δˆ5 = 0.0583, implying that the AFC created an average interest-
rate diﬀerential of 1.18 percentage points between the HK and US three-month rates.
Meanwhile, the LR statistic is 2.8746 for H0 : δ4 = δ5 and 66.6002 for H0 : γ4 = γ5,
confirming that the AFC did cause not only a rise in the level, but also a rise in the
volatility of HK’s three-month interbank rate.19 The impact of the AFC on the over-
night rate is, however, very diﬀerent from that on the three-month rate. As explained in
Remark 5c of Table 1, whenever there was any shortage in the liquidity of the over-night
interbank market, the HKMA soon provided additional liquidity through the LAF (or
other channels such as money market activities), causing a quick reversal of the over-
night rate back to the normal level. In this case, there might not be a significant surge
in the average level of the over-night rate, although the surge in the first day of an
individual shock might be substantial. From the results reported in Table 3, δˆ5 is in fact
lower than δˆ4 and the LR statistic for H0 : δ4 = δ5 is 0.9026, which is not statistically
significant. Besides, the LR statistic for H0 : γ4 = γ5 is 0.8822, suggesting that the
eﬀects of the AFC on the volatility of the over-night rate may have been nullified by the
huge injection of short-term liquidity by the HKMA.
We now come to the eﬀects of the anti-crisis package on the three-month rate during
the second part of the crisis period. As we can see from Table 4, there were (i) a sharp
reduction in the HK-US interest-rate diﬀerential from 118 basis points in sub-period P5
19The diﬀerence between δˆ4 and δˆ5 is statistically significant at the 10% level, but not at the 5% level.
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to 44 basis points in sub-period P6, and (ii) a sharp reduction in the volatility coeﬃcient
from 0.0558 in sub-period P5 to 0.0064 in sub-period P6. Thus, the much lower values of
(δˆ6, γˆ6), as compared against (δˆ5, γˆ5), have at least provided a rudimentary evidence that
the anti-crisis package has helped to reduce both the level and volatility of the HK-US
three-month interest-rate diﬀerential induced by the crisis. A test for H0 : γ5 = γ6 gives
a LR statistic of 23.2778, confirming that the impact of the anti-crisis package on the
volatility of the three-month rate is statistically significant. Nevertheless, because of the
large standard error for δˆ6 and δˆ5, the LR statistic for H0 : δ5 = δ6 is only 0.7830 (not
statistically significant). The case for the over-night rate in sub-period P6 is somewhat
diﬀerent. As the HKMA’s provision of short-term liquidity implied no significant rise in
the average level of the over-night interest-rate diﬀerential in sub-period P5, the anti-
crisis package would most likely have no significant eﬀects on the average level of the
over-night interest-rate diﬀerential in sub-period P6. In fact, the LR statistics for H0 :
δ5 = δ6 is 0.6383 and the LR statistics for H0 : γ5 = γ6 is 0.0844, confirming the null
hypothesis of no significant change in the average level and volatility of the over-night
diﬀerential between sub-periods P5 and P6.
Finally, we come to the three-month interest-rate diﬀerential during the post-crisis
period (sub-period P7). As we can see from δˆ7 and γˆ7 in Table 4, the convertibility
undertaking within the anti-crisis package and the eventual fading out of the crisis have
(i) virtually removed all the risk premium between the HK and US three-month interbank
rate (i.e., δˆ7 is close to zero and its t statistic is low); and (ii) brought the volatility of the
three-month interest diﬀerential down to more normal level (γˆ7 = 0.0020). Besides, the
LR statistic for H0 : γ6 = γ7 is 5.1504, confirming that the fading out of the crisis has led
to further reduction in the volatility of the three-month interest-rate diﬀerential. The
large diﬀerence in the magnitude of δˆ7 and δˆ6 suggests that the fading out of the crisis
was associated with a substantial reduction in the diﬀerential, although the LR statistic
for H0 : δ6 = δ7 is only 0.8993 (not statistically significant) due to a high standard error
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in the estimate of δ6.
As explained in Remark 7c of Table 1, the very short-term nature of the over-night
rate and transaction cost imply that there may be a wide range of over-night diﬀerential
before uncovered interest arbitrage would take place. Thus, the actual level and volatility
of the over-night rate diﬀerential in the post-crisis period could be higher or lower than
the pre-crisis period, depending on the supply of short-term liquidity and the HKMA’s
tendency for discretionary liquidity injection. As pointed out in Section 2.5, (i) the
amount of short-term liquidity in the discount window facility in the post-crisis period
was in fact higher than that in the LAF before the crisis, and (ii) because of the criticism
against the HKMA’s discretionary liquidity policy, the HKMA became less inclined to
short-term liquidity injection and withdrawal. As we can see from Table 3, the former
caused a downward bias in HK’s over-night rate similar to that in sub-period P4,
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the latter led to an over-night interest-rate volatility significantly higher than that in
sub-period P4 but not much diﬀerent from that in sub-period P2.21
Finally Table 5 presents the estimated parameters when the zero and equality restric-
tions are imposed. In addition to the disucssions above, joint restrictions are imposed
(as opposed to pairwise restrictions). The LR statistics verify that the restrictions im-
posed cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level. The long-run mean diﬀerentials of the
interest rates are then upated based on the new estimates.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have outlined the monetary reforms in HK’s CBS since the late 1980s.
We have estimated the impacts of these reforms and the 1997-98 AFC on the interest-rate
diﬀerentials between the US and HK, both in terms of the level and the volatility. We find
support for the HKMA’s claim that, prior to the Accounting Arrangements introduced
20The LR statistic for H0 : δ4 = δ7 is 0.2148.
21The LR statistic for H0 : γ4 = γ7 is 56.7460 and the LR statistic for H0 : γ2 = γ7 is 0.8766.
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in July 1988, the HSBC was able to exploit its position as a clearing bank by creating
money without an appropriate increase in the US dollar backup, causing a downward
bias in the diﬀerential between the HK and US interest rates. Of particular interest is
that the downward bias for the over-night rate was markedly higher than that for the
three-month rate. One possible reason for this is that risk consideration has made the
HSBC more willing to create money for very short-term (over-night) loans/transactions
rather than longer-term (three-month) loans/transactions. With the introduction of the
Accounting Arrangements since July 1988, the HSBC was no longer capable of creating
HK dollar as mentioned. As a result, the HK-US interest-rate diﬀerential returned to
positive during the Accounting-Arrangements period. In addition to the downward bias,
it is found that the HSBC’s special position in the Pre-Accounting-Arrangements period
led to higher volatility in the interest-rate diﬀerential. Again, because of HSBC’s higher
risk aversion over the longer end, the rise in the volatility of the over-night rate was
significantly higher than that of the three-month rate.
We also find that the LAF introduced in July 1992 reduced both the level and
volatility of HK’s over-night rate. In fact, the LAF removed the risk premium between
the HK and US over-night rates. The impacts of the LAF on the over-night rate were
also transmitted to the three-month rate (say through the mechanism described by the
liquidity premium theory), leading to a reduction in both the level and volatility of
the three-month interest-rate diﬀerential. Rather than jumping to the conclusion that
the reduction in the interest-rate volatility has benefited the HK economy, we would
caution that this could have been achieved at the cost of fueling the already high over-
subscription of the IPOs in HK. Our reservation is even stronger when it comes to the
Revised Mode of Monetary Operations. In fact, we have found that the Revised Mode
led to a downward bias in the HK-US interest-rate diﬀerentials — a result that is not
recognized or addressed by the HKMA. That is, with the HKMA more inclined to inject
short-term liquidity to finance huge over-subscription of IPOs and seasonal demand for
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liquidity, the interest rate in HK, especially at the shorter end, tended to be lower than
its US counterpart. Given that the HK economy was plagued by high inflation with
asset price bubble building up at that time,22 the downward bias was probably harmful
to the economy by adding fuel to inflation and asset bubble.
We have found that the AFC in 1997-98 led to an increase in the level and volatility
of HK’s three-month rate. The higher medium-term interest rate was widely believed
to be the source of HK’s economic pain during the crisis. We have also found that the
anti-crisis package introduced in September 1998 led to a drastic decline in the level
and volatility of HK’s three-month rate. In fact, with the convertibility undertaking
inherent in the seven Technical Measures, interest rate arbitrage was revitalized, which
in turn brought HK’s three-month rate down to the US level. While the revised version
of discount window in the seven Technical Measures might have also contributed to the
reduction of HK’s three-month rates from exceptionally high levels towards the US level,
it also created a strange monetary definition in which HK is the only economy in the
world with long term (Exchange Fund) bonds being included as part of the monetary
base. The behavior of HK’s over-night rate was, however, more complicated, as it was
also aﬀected by HKMA’s reaction (reversal) to market changes.
22HK’s CPI inflation rate in 1994 was 8.7%, substantially higher than the 2.6% in the US. Meanwhile,
HK’s property price index rose by 37.5%, 40.5%, 10.4% and 25.4%, respectively, in 1991, 1992, 1993
and 1994.
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Appendix: Speculative Strategy used by Speculators on the HK
Market during the AFC
This appendix provides an account of the strategy used by the speculators on the HK
financial markets in September/October 1997. Exploiting the precarious fixed exchange-
rate system during the crisis, the speculators adopted a “double-play” strategy in the
foreign exchange and stock futures market. Their strategy consists of the following steps.
Step 1: Preparation
The speculators first borrowed, or pre-funded themselves with, substantial amount
of medium-term (6-12 months) HK dollar through the swap market (i.e., swapping US
dollar for HK dollar). Some speculators also bought HK dollar (and sold US dollar)
forward in the forward market. In the stock futures market, the speculators started
to build up large short positions. To equip themselves with the ability to create panic
selling in the stock market during the formal attack, the speculators also utilized the
“loophole” in the stock custodian sector to borrow substantial amount of shares from
the custodians and trustees.
Step 2: Formal attack
After the above preparation, the speculators sold their pre-funded HK dollar (and
bought US dollar) in the spot market. To maximize the impact of their attack, they
sold the HK dollar in the relatively thin oﬀshore markets. When the HKMA attempted
to support the HK dollar by purchasing the HK dollar, the interbank liquidity was
squeezed. This in turn caused a surge in the interbank rate. In addition to selling in
the spot market, the speculators also sold large amount of HK dollar (and bought US
dollar) in the forward market. As banks usually did arbitrage between the swap market
and the interbank market, the forward selling of HK dollar would also bid up HK’s
interbank rate. This would create a sentiment that the HK dollar was under attack,
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thus attracting more speculators to follow.
Concurrently, the speculators attacked the stock market by (i) selling their shares
originally borrowed from the custodians, and (ii) accelerating their selling in the stock
futures market with a high profile (arbitrage would ensure that a fall in the stock futures
also caused a fall in the spot stock market). These actions would create panic selling of
shares. In fact, these strategies turned out to be very successful and there was substantial
fall in HK’s stock index during the attack.
Step 3: Profit taking
Having bid up the interbank rate and pushed down the spot and futures stock indices,
the speculators took their profits by closing the short positions in the stock futures
market. The also bought back the shares (at much lower prices) and returned them
to the custodian. In the foreign exchange market, they closed their short position in
forward HK dollar (and made profit from the lower forward rate), and lent out any
surplus HK dollar (at a shorter maturity) earlier borrowed from the swap market.
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Table 1: Summary of the Probable Impacts of the Reforms in HK’s CBS on the Interbank Rates
Over-night rate Three-month rate
Period/Event Level Volatility Level Volatility
P1: Before the Downward biased Unspecified Downward biased Unspecified
Accounting Arrangements Remark 1a: Before the introduction of the Accounting Arrangements, there tended to be
a downward bias in the local interest rates relative to the US interest rates.
Remark 1b: If the HSBC was more risk averse in creating money at the longer end, the
downward bias in the over-night rate would be greater than that of the three-month rate.
P2: Introduction of the Remove bias, positive premium Unspecified Remove bias, positive premium Unspecified
Accounting Arrangements Remark 2: The Accounting Arrangements would remove the downward bias and cause a
starting 1 July 1988 positive but moderate over-night and three-month interest-rate diﬀerential between HK
and the US.
P3: Introduction of the Unspecified Reduce Unspecified Reduce
LAF Starting 1 June 1992 Remark 3a: The introduction of the LAF would cause a reduction in the volatility of
HK’s over-night and three-month rates relative to the US dollar rates.
Remark 3b: As the process involves injection of liquidity, the level of HK’s
over-night and three-month interest-rate diﬀerentials in this sub-period may be lower
than the previous sub-period.
P4: Introduction of the Reduce, possibly downward bias Reduce Reduce, possibly downward bias Reduce
Revised Mode of Remark 4a: Relative to sub-period P2, the introduction of the Revised Mode of
Monetary Operations Monetary Operations would reduce the volatility of HK’s over-night and three-month
starting 16 March 1994 interest-rate diﬀerentials.
Remark 4b: In case the HKMA injected short-term liquidity to finance the huge
over-subscription of IPOs, it could reduce the level of HK’s interbank rates and
re-establish a downward bias in HK’s interbank rates.
P5: Asian Financial Crisis Unspecified Unspecified Increase Increase
before anti-crisis measures Remark 5a: The crisis would increase the level and volatility of HK’s three-month rate.
Remark 5b: If the HKMA soon provided additional short-term liquidity through
the LAF, money market activities or other channels whenever there was a shortage
of liquidity in the over-night market, there could be a quick reversal of the over-night rate
so that there might or might not be a significant surge in the average level and volatility of
over-night rate even though the surge in the first day of each shock could be substantial.
P6: Asian Financial Crisis Unspecified Unspecified Reduce Reduce
with anti-crisis package Remark 6a: The anti-crisis package would bring HK’s three-month rate back
towards the US level.
Remark 6b: It would also reduce the volatility of HK’s three-month rate.
Remark 6c: Its eﬀect on the over-night rate would be unknown if the HKMA did provide
additional short-term liquidity immediately after each individual shock during the crisis.
P7: Post-crisis period Unspecified Unspecified Zero premium Low
starting 19 December 1988 Remark 7a: The convertibility undertaking within the anti-crisis package would
encourage uncovered interest arbitrage, which would in turn remove the risk premium
between the HK and US three-month rates.
Remark 7b: Uncovered interest arbitrage would ensure a low volatility in the three-month
interest-rate diﬀerential.
Remark 7c: Because of the very short-term nature of the over-night rate, and the
transaction costs, a wide range of over-night interest-rate diﬀerential may be required before
uncovered interest arbitrage would take place. In such case, the actual level and volatility
of the over-night diﬀerential may be lower or higher than the pre-crisis period, depending
on the supply of the over-night liquidity and HKMA’s tendency for discretionary
liquidity injection. For example, if the amount of short-term liquidity in the discount
window facility in the post-crisis period was larger than that in the LAF before the
crisis, the downward bias in the post-crisis period could be larger than that in sub-period
P4. On the other hand, if public criticism on HKMA’s discretionary liquidity policy
suceeded in making the HKMA more hesitant in repeating their actions in sub-periods
P3 and P4, the over-night rate volatility in the post-crisis period could be higher.
Table 2: Summary statistics of the interbank rates
Over-night rate Three-month rate
Statistic HK US HK US
Mean 5.489 5.790 6.276 6.019
Median 5.250 5.563 5.977 5.750
Maximum 23.500 10.750 18.438 10.500
Minimum 0.155 2.813 0.625 3.063
Std Dev 2.159 1.656 2.108 1.668
Std Skewness 0.812 0.331 0.773 0.308
Std Kurtosis 5.390 2.799 4.309 2.671
ADF statistics
Interest rates —3.210 —0.943 —3.038 —0.994
Diﬀerenced interest rates —20.465 —14.723 —30.248 —66.69
Note: ADF statistic is the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic of test for
unit root. Four lags are implemented in the regression.
Table 3: Estimation results of the over-night interbank
interest-rate diﬀerentials of HK versus US
Parameter Estimate Standard Mean
error diﬀerential
φ1 0.7059∗∗∗ 0.0191
φ2 0.0974∗∗∗ 0.0208
φ4 0.0447∗∗∗ 0.0134
δ1 —0.4591∗∗∗ 0.0348 —3.021
δ2 0.0277∗∗ 0.0129 0.182
δ3 0.0006 0.0159 0.004
δ4 —0.0537∗∗∗ 0.0073 —0.353
δ5 —0.0766∗∗∗ 0.0212 —0.504
δ6 —0.0216 0.0453 —0.142
δ7 —0.0628∗∗∗ 0.0145 —0.413
γ1 0.4098∗∗∗ 0.0237
γ2 0.0756∗∗∗ 0.0041
γ3 0.0605∗∗∗ 0.0034
γ4 0.0292∗∗∗ 0.0013
γ5 0.0358∗∗∗ 0.0047
γ6 0.0397∗∗∗ 0.0106
γ7 0.0847∗∗∗ 0.0067
α 0.4399∗∗∗ 0.0162
β 0.4047∗∗∗ 0.0173
Likelihood ratio (LR) statistics for parameter restrictions
Restriction LR Restriction LR
δ1 = δ2 57.2602∗∗∗ γ1 = γ2 153.1784∗∗∗
δ2 = δ3 1.3084 γ2 = γ3 3.5934∗
δ2 = δ4 21.4522∗∗∗ γ2 = γ4 85.0286∗∗∗
δ3 = δ4 7.7313∗∗∗ γ3 = γ4 35.6182∗∗∗
δ4 = δ5 0.9026 γ4 = γ5 0.8822
δ5 = δ6 0.6383 γ5 = γ6 0.0844
δ6 = δ7 0.7732 γ6 = γ7 6.1952∗∗∗
Note: The mean interest-rate diﬀerential in sub-period Pi is calculated by
δˆi/(1−
S
j φˆj). The asterisks ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote rejection of the null hypoth-
esis (restriction) at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively.
Table 4: Estimation results of the three-month interbank
interest-rate diﬀerentials of HK versus US
Parameter Estimate Standard Mean
error diﬀerential
φ1 0.7687∗∗∗ 0.0197
φ2 0.1820∗∗∗ 0.0191
δ1 —0.0440∗∗∗ 0.0104 —0.892
δ2 0.0161∗∗∗ 0.0048 0.327
δ3 0.0069∗∗∗ 0.0026 0.140
δ4 —0.0049∗∗ 0.0024 —0.099
δ5 0.0583∗ 0.0332 1.183
δ6 0.0216 0.0198 0.438
δ7 —0.0001 0.0034 0.020
γ1 0.0092∗∗∗ 0.0007
γ2 0.0063∗∗∗ 0.0002
γ3 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0001
γ4 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0001
γ5 0.0558∗∗∗ 0.0080
γ6 0.0064∗∗∗ 0.0022
γ7 0.0020∗∗ 0.0001
α 0.4114∗∗∗ 0.0121
β 0.5522∗∗∗ 0.0087
Likelihood ratio (LR) statistics for parameter restrictions
Restriction LR Restriction LR
δ1 = δ2 18.4132∗∗∗ γ1 = γ2 5.1374∗∗∗
δ2 = δ3 2.3556 γ2 = γ3 114.0080∗∗∗
δ2 = δ4 14.6878∗∗∗ γ2 = γ4 184.6124∗∗∗
δ3 = δ4 7.6674∗∗∗ γ3 = γ4 0.3156
δ4 = δ5 2.8746∗ γ4 = γ5 66.6002∗∗∗
δ5 = δ6 0.7830 γ5 = γ6 23.2778∗∗∗
δ6 = δ7 0.8993 γ6 = γ7 5.1504∗∗∗
Note: The mean interest-rate diﬀerential in sub-period Pi is calculated by
δˆi/(1−
S
j φˆj). The asterisks ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote rejection of the null hypoth-
esis (restriction) at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively.
Table 5: Estimation results of the restricted models of the interbank interest-rate
diﬀerentials of HK versus US
Over-night rate Three-month rate
Parameter Estimate Standard Mean Parameter Estimate Standard Mean
error diﬀerential error diﬀerential
φ1 0.7059 0.0190 φ1 0.7693 0.0196
φ2 0.0964 0.0206 φ2 0.1825 0.0190
φ4 0.0460 0.0134
δ1 —0.4571 0.0347 —3.013 δ1 —0.0428 0.0102 —0.888
δ2 0.0275 0.0132 0.181 δ2 0.0157 0.0048 0.326
δ4 = δ5 = δ7 —0.0578 0.0065 —0.381 δ3 0.0068 0.0025 0.141
δ4 —0.0050 0.0024 —0.104
δ5 0.0556 0.0327 1.154
γ1 0.3856 0.0218 γ1 0.0091 0.0007
γ2 = γ7 0.0736 0.0038 γ2 = γ6 0.0063 0.0002
γ3 0.0573 0.0031 γ3 = γ4 0.0014 0.0001
γ4 = γ5 = γ6 0.0288 0.0012 γ5 0.0559 0.0001
γ7 0.0020 0.0001
α 0.4283 0.0154 α 0.4104 0.0121
β 0.4288 0.0164 β 0.5528 0.0087
LR statistic 4.0314 LR statistic 1.3232
Note: The mean interest-rate diﬀerential in sub-period Pi is calculated by δˆi/(1−
S
j φˆj). LR statistic
is the likelihood ratio statistic for testing the constrained models versus the unconstrained models
reported in Tables 2 and 3. For the over-night rate, the constraints are: δ3 = 0, δ6 = 0, δ4 =
δ5 = δ7, γ4 = γ5 = γ6, γ2 = γ7. The LR statistic is approximately distributed as a χ27 when the
constraints hold. For the three-month rate, the constraints are: δ6 = 0, δ7 = 0, γ2 = γ6, γ3 = γ4.
The LR statistic is approximately distributed as a χ24 when the constraints hold.



